We study the emergence of conditional cooperation in the presence of both intra-group and inter-group selection. Individuals play public goods games within their groups using conditional strategies, which are represented as piecewise linear response functions. Accordingly, groups engage in conflicts with a certain probability. In contrast to previous studies, we consider continuous contribution levels and a rich set of conditional strategies, allowing for a wide range of possible interactions between strategies. We find that the existence of conditional strategies enables the stabilization of cooperation even under strong intra-group selection. The strategy that eventually dominates in the population has two key properties: (i) It is unexploitable with strong intra-group selection; (ii) It can achieve full contribution to outperform other strategies in the inter-group selection. The success of this strategy is robust to initial conditions as well as changes to important parameters. We also investigate the influence of different factors on cooperation levels, including group conflicts, group size, and migration rate. Their effect on cooperation can be attributed to and explained by their influence on the relative strength of intra-group and inter-group selection.
. Axelrod summarizes three properties exhibited by successful strategies in the tournaments: niceness, forgiveness, and provocability. They are never the first to defect (nice); they forgive an isolated defection and are willing to come back to cooperation (forgiving); they are always provoked by a defection no matter how good the interaction has been so far (provocable). Axelrod also uses an evolutionary experiment with a population initially using the submitted strategies (and a strategy that randomly chooses an action), where an individual's expected number of offspring is proportional to the average payoff they receive. Tit-For-Tat thus quickly becomes the most widely-used strategy, and the success implies that the principle of direct reciprocity (provocability and forgiveness) makes it possible for cooperation to be established 5 . Indeed, many other computational models have demonstrated that strategies incorporating direct reciprocity are vital for the emergence of cooperation [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] . In human societies, many activities require collective endeavor with more than two people, making the two-player prisoner's dilemma an inadequate model. Such situations can be modeled as a public goods game, an n-player extension of the prisoner's dilemma 11, 12 . In a public goods game, players decide how much of their endowment to contribute to the public good that benefits all group members. While it is socially optimal to contribute everything, players can get higher payoff if they contribute nothing, regardless of other people's actions.
Using evolutionary games, it has been shown that spatial structure can give rise to different patterns that promote cooperation in comparison to a well-mixed population [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] . In the context of the public goods game, many mechanisms, including voluntary participation 20 , opportunity to select neighbors 21, 22 , reward and Scientific RepoRts | 6:23006 | DOI: 10.1038/srep23006 punishment [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] , referring to the social performance 30 , and heterogeneity in the number of neighbors 14 , in wealth distribution 31 , in learning activities 32 , in benefit obtained from the public goods 33, 34 , as well as the group size [35] [36] [37] and in-group favoritism 38, 39 have been shown to promote cooperation. Considering the similarity between prisoner's dilemma and public goods games, a natural question to ask is whether direct reciprocity that works well in two-player prisoner's dilemma can be generalized to a social dilemma that involves n players. In order for direct reciprocity to function effectively, players need to condition their actions on the actions of others so that free-riders can be punished. In public goods provision, however, it is hard, if not impossible, for direct reciprocity to work. Players can punish low performance by withdrawing contribution, but this punishment cannot be directed exclusively to free-riders -it hurts other cooperators as well. On the other hand, reducing contributions to punish free-riding can be misinterpreted as defecting. This ambiguity of intention makes it hard for conditional strategies to work, and in principle, the consensus is that the extension is problematic because of the inherently imperfect information in terms of with whom to reciprocate 40 . Nevertheless, recent research shows that some approaches, like image scoring, work very well in groups too 41 . Several experiments have confirmed that many subjects in the lab do use conditional strategies in the context of public goods games [42] [43] [44] . Given its importance and prevalence, it is surprising that not much research has been devoted to studying conditional strategies in the realm of the public goods game. In 45 , for example, a set of six strategies with binary contribution levels was considered, and it was shown that the most cautious conditional strategy -contribute when everyone in the group contributes -is likely to dominate the population. Notably, punishment and reward can also be considered as conditional strategies. However, these require information on each player's performance, which is often unavailable. In this paper, we show that with full anonymity and only information on the average contribution level, the use of conditional strategies alone can still make cooperation possible.
This paper extends previous work and strives to understand and explain how people's conditional strategies came into existence in the presence of multilevel selection, and how the existence of conditional strategies influences cooperation. In contrast to previous studies, we consider continuous contribution levels and assume individuals use piecewise linear response functions. While linear response functions have been studies in the context of two-player alternating prisoner's dilemma [46] [47] [48] [49] , we found no records of their consideration in the context of the public goods game. This setup enables us to consider a wide range of conditional strategies with continuous contribution levels, which allows for interesting and rich interactions between strategies.
Multilevel selection imposes structure on the population, which can be considered as a kind of spatial structure [50] [51] [52] [53] . While in most spatial/network models individuals are members in multiple groups, people can belong to only one group in multilevel selection model. While conventional spatial/network games can represent social interactions in a complex society, multilevel selection can characterize ancestral human societies where people closely interact with their group members within a tribe. Because multilevel selection model reflects the situation in early human societies where cooperative preferences are likely to evolve [see 54 , Chapter 6] for detailed discussion], it is an important model to understand human cooperation.
Multilevel selection has been shown to be promising to explain the large-scale cooperation that exists only in human societies 55, 56 , and it has been extensively used in the literature to study the evolution of social institutions 57 , indirect reciprocity and social norms 58, 59 , the emergence of altruistic punishment [60] [61] [62] , and parochial altruism [63] [64] [65] . Previous studies on the evolution of cooperation in the setting of multilevel selection mainly focus on unconditional strategies. One conclusion from these studies is cooperation is possible only when intra-group selection is weak and there is enough "reproductive leveling" 66 . This paper contributes to the literature of multilevel selection by considering conditional strategies, and we show that the introduction of conditional strategies make cooperation possible, even with strong within-group selection.
Results
The dynamics of contribution level and the evolution of strategies using baseline parameter values are shown in Fig. 1 [see Methods for the evolutionary model and the representation of strategies, and Table 1 for parameters]. In the left panel of Fig. 1 , we see that the average contribution starts from 0.5, which is consistent with the contribution level when individuals all choose a random strategy. During the first 20 generations, contribution drops to below 0.1. After around generation 20, the average contribution level gradually increases and eventually reaches and stabilizes around 0.8. In contrast, if we constrain the strategy space to unconditional strategies, cooperation cannot be established: Type 0 will quickly dominate in the population, and the contribution level gets stuck around 0 throughout the simulation (not shown). This shows that conditional strategies play an important role in the emergence of cooperation. Notably, if we only consider unconditional strategies, individual selection must be weak (e.g., w > 10) in order for cooperation to emerge.
The right panel of Fig. 1 demonstrates that, among all the 27 strategies, only 4 account for non-negligible proportions in the population. At the start, each of the 27 strategies is used by a bit more than 3% of the population, then we observe steep increases in the numbers of three strategies during the first 20 generations -Type 0, Type 1, and Type 2. After around 20 generations, Type 2 gradually increases in number and its frequency eventually stabilizes around 90%.
Comparing the left and the right panel of Fig. 1 , we see that the initial decrease in cooperation level coincides with the increase in the number of Type 0, Type 1, and Type 2 in the population, while the stable increase is accompanies by the increase in the number of Type 2 strategy. 57 , these values might properly reflect early human environments.
What drives the changes in the cooperation level and strategy composition? As illustrated by Equation (4), there is a tension between inter-group selection and intra-group selection: while strong inter-group selection tends to increase cooperative behavior, intra-group selection drives it away. It is therefore interesting to investigate and compare the relative strength for these two types of selection. Fig. 1 , we see that the decrease in the average cooperation level coincides with the time span where intra-group selection is strong relative to inter-group selection. After the strength of intra-group selection drops and stabilizes, stronger inter-group selection causes the average cooperation level to increase.
The dynamics of selection strength sheds light on the characteristics of successful strategies. With strong intra-group selection, we observe increases in the numbers of the three strategies: Type 0, Type 1, and Type 2. All these three strategies are characterized by zero contribution when < .
.
In an environment where everyone randomly chooses a strategy, individuals using these strategies cannot be exploited and can sometimes take advantage of other group members' contribution. For the two conditionally cooperative strategies Type 1 and Type 2, they never contribute more than − c i j , . These observations lead us to conclude that unexploitable strategies can persist in the population when intra-group selection is strong.
As intra-group selection subsides and inter-group selection intensifies, Type 2 starts to dominate in the population. Compared to Type 1, groups with all Type 2 individuals can achieve full contribution. Because of this, this strategy eventually drives out Type 1 in the presence of strong group selection. This provides evidence that strategies that make full contribution possible on the group level will spread and dominate in the population, even when inter-group selection is strong.
In summary, Type 2 becomes the predominant strategy due to its two important properties: 1. It cannot be exploited by other strategies on the intra-group selection; 2. It makes high group contribution possible on the group level. Type 1 and Type 0 perform well in the presence of intra-group selection, but they cannot sustain high contribution and will lose during inter-group competition.
Type 5 (perfectly conditional cooperators) seems to be a great candidate for successful strategies, because it can achieve a high group contribution level, and at the same time they never contributes more than the average contribution level. However, it only account for a quite small (although stable) proportion throughout the evolutionary process. This is because it does not have the second property of Type 2. When "irrational" strategies, such as always cooperate (Type 26) or cooperate when average contribution is low (Type 18), are present in the population due to random mutation, they will induce Type 5 to contribute. Free-riders in situations like this would outperform Type 5 and take over the population. Type 2 on the other hand is resistant against these irrational strategies and can survive when intra-group selection is strong.
Effect of initial conditions. To test the robustness of Type 2 strategy against different initial conditions, we run simulations where population are initialized with different strategies. Figure 4 shows the dynamics when the population is initialized as all free-riders (Type 0) or all perfectly conditional cooperators (Type 5). We see that the population initialized with all free-riders exhibit similar dynamics as the population randomly initialized: Var(c j ) quickly drops from 0.14 and stabilizes around 0.004, while E(Var(c ij )) gradual increases. With the intensifying inter-group-level selection, we also observe an increase in the contribution level and the number of Type 2 strategies. When the population starts with all perfectly conditional cooperators, we first observe a sharp , proxy for the strength of intra-group selection, starts around 0.12, then quickly drops to and stabilizes around 0.04 during the first 20 generations. In contrast, Var(c j ), proxy for the strength of inter-group selection, starts near 0, steadily increases, and eventually stabilizes around 0.12. In comparison with the left panel of Fig. 1 , the decrease in the average cooperation level coincides with the time span where intra-group selection is strong relative to inter-group selection. After the strength of intra-group selection drops and stabilizes, intensifying inter-group selection causes the average cooperation level to increase. reduction on the average contribution level and then a gradual increase. There is also a first decrease and then increase in the strength of inter-group selection.
In both initial conditions, as in the case with random strategies, the contribution level eventually stabilizes around 0.8. As for the selection strength, it eventually stabilizes around 0.004 on the individual level and around 0.12 on the group level. Further investigation shows that Type 2 will eventually become the predominant strategy if we start with homogeneous population with other strategies -the initial conditions do not affect the success of Type 2 strategy, nor do they influence the long-run contribution level, strategy frequency, or selection strength.
Effects of group conflict, group size, and migration. Figure 5 illustrates how cooperation changes as we vary the probability of group conflicts (k), group size (n), and migration rate (m). Besides average contribution level, we also use the average length of cooperative epochs to measure the stability of cooperation quantitatively. Cooperative epochs are defined as sustained periods where population contribution levels are above 60%. We note that the presented results are insensitive to the threshold used in the definition of cooperative epochs.
Increasing the probability of group conflicts, decreasing group size, or decreasing migration rate can all lead to an increase in the cooperation level and stability of cooperation. How cooperation changes with different parameters can be explained by the tension between group-level selection and individual-level selection. Effects that increase Var(c j ) tend to increase cooperation level, while effects that increase E[Var(c ij )] tend to decrease cooperation. Because group conflicts intensify inter-group selection, we see cooperation level increases with the probability of group conflicts. On the other hand, increasing group size or migration rate decreases cooperation. With different initial conditions, average contribution, strategy frequency, and selection strength all eventually converge to similar levels, and the success of Type 2 is robust to initial conditions. Top panels: average contribution level eventually stabilizes around 0.8. Middle panels: Type 2 eventually dominates in the population. Bottom panels: strength of intra-group selection and strength of inter-group selection stabilize around similar levels with different initial conditions.
As shown in Fig. 5 , cooperation can emerge for a wide range of parameter values. For all the parameters investigated in simulations, we observe that high cooperation levels are always accompanied by the prevalence of Type 2 strategies. This also provides evidence on the robustness of Type 2.
Effect of selection strength. To investigate the effect of selection strength on the evolution of conditional cooperation, we run the simulation for different values of baseline fitness w 0 . We know that in the case of unconditional cooperation, greater w 0 indicates weaker intra-group selection, making it easier for cooperation to get established. Figure 6 shows that increasing the value of w 0 can indeed increase overall cooperation level. As shown in the top panel, overall contribution level increases from a bit over 60% at w 0 = 0 to over 80% at w 0 = 5. The stability of cooperation does not change significantly with selection strength, as shown in the bottom panel.
When intra-group selection is weak enough, even unconditional cooperation can emerge. Therefore, we would expect that unconditional cooperation can persist in the population with large w 0 . This is indeed the case, as shown in Fig. 7 . As we increase w 0 , strategies that prescribe cooperation even when group contribution is low start to persist in the population: there is little selection against these strategies with large w 0 because cooperation level is often high. Due to group-level selection, however, all the strategies that persist in the population prescribe full contribution when all the group members cooperate.
Discussion
In this paper, we use the concept of multilevel selection to study the emergence of conditional cooperation in the setting of public goods provision. We consider a strategy space with 27 possible conditional strategies represented by piecewise linear response functions, which allows a wide range of possible interactions between strategies. Under full anonymity, players only know the average group contribution level, but not the contribution of other group members. Our results may help explain the emergence of cooperation without mechanisms that requires individual information, such as reputation and punishment.
The existence of conditional strategies renders cooperation a viable and stable alternative. In contrast, if people are constrained to use unconditional strategies, cooperation can not prevail under intra-group selection. The strategy that eventually dominates in the population is Type 2, which can achieve full group cooperation but at the same time is unexploitable by others. Changing the probability of group conflicts, group size, or migration rate does not influence the success and prevalence of Type 2 strategy, thus indicating notable robustness of this evolutionary outcome.
In our model, we have a wide range of conditional strategies. One potential concern is whether the population size (400) is large enough to allow for interactions between this large number of strategies. To address this concern, we run simulations for different population size while keeping the group size fixed at 20. We observe no significant differences in the overall cooperation levels and the strategy distributions, indicating that the population size used is sufficiently large for investigating the evolution of 27 strategies [see Supplementary Information for details].
As pointed out before, the multilevel selection model assumes that individuals always play against the same group of people. While this captures some characteristics of early human society, it would be interesting Methods Consider a population with g groups, each group j has n j members (j = 1, 2, …, g). Each individual has initial endowment 1. Individual i in group j decides the amount c ij (0 ≤ c ij ≤ 1) to contribute to a public good that benefits all members in the same group. Contribution by all group members will be multiplied by r and then evenly distributed among all group members. The payoff of individual i in group j can be expressed as It is optimal for the group if everyone contributes all their endowment. However, because the MPCR is less than 1, individuals can always be better off by contributing less to the public good, no matter what other members do. The only Nash equilibrium in this game is therefore zero contribution by all members.
Analysis from evolutionary game theory also shows that any individual making positive contribution will eventually be weeded out by the evolutionary process. In evolutionary game theory, the transmission of a trait (or a behavior, a strategy) is related to the payoff of the individual with that trait. Notably, the transmission can be genetic or cultural. In genetic transmission, genes bring higher payoffs are more likely to pass on; in cultural transmission, successful strategies are more likely to be learned by others. As the nature of the transmission does not influence the theoretical implications, we can abstract from the underlying mechanism of transmission of traits. When w 0 in Equation (1) is small relative to 1, the selection on this trait is strong. If w 0 is relatively large, we have weak selection. It is obvious to see that the intra-group selection will eventually drive out cooperative individuals, whether it is strong or weak selection. However, if there is inter-group selection that is strong enough compared to intra-group selection, cooperation can get established.
The Price equation.
The viability of cooperation under multilevel selection can be illustrated using the Price equation 67 . The Price equation assumes selective migration where groups with higher average payoffs will grow in size compared to those with lower payoffs. Denote q j as the fraction of the population that is in group j. Let w j = ∑ i w ij /n j be the average payoff group j, and w = ∑ j q j w j be the average population payoff.
The sizes of the groups change from one period to the next proportionally to their relative payoff. Denote ′ q j as the fraction of the population in group j in the next period, then selective migration prescribes
Now consider the altruistic trait A which prescribes full contribution to the public good, and the selfish trait S which prescribes zero contribution. The Price Equation can be used to study any trait that can potentially influence individual payoffs. Because a cooperative action by definition benefits others at a personal cost, here cooperation and altruism are used interchangeably and we can thus simply call individuals with trait A (unconditional) cooperators. We use p ij = 1 to represent that individual i in group j has the trait A and p ij = 0 otherwise. Denoting p j as A's frequency in group j and p its population frequency of A, we can derive the following Price equation [refer to Supplementary Information for details]
Here the expectation and covariance are weighted by q j . Because w is always positive, trait A increases in frequency as long as the right hand side is positive. The change in its population frequency can hence be partitioned into two parts: the two terms on the right hand size characterize inter-group and intra-group selection respectively. Substituting the payoff represented by Equation (1) into the above equation, we obtain the Price equation in the context of public goods provision:
Note that the second term is always negative. In order for evolution to favor altruists, we need inter-group selection measured by var(p j ) to be strong compared to intra-group selection measured by E[var(p ij )]. Assuming individuals are drawn to reproduce with probability equal to their share of the total group payoff, we must have w 0 ≫ 1 in Equation (1) to make it possible for cooperation to emerge. With strong selection w ≈ 0, the payoff of a defector in a group of cooperators is much higher, making it impossible for trait A to persist in the population.
The Price equation has great limitations. It only applies to systems with a relatively small number of traits (strategies). As we include more strategies, it quickly becomes intractable to characterize the system analytically. It helps identify equilibria but cannot provide the dynamics that lead to the equilibria. We know that group conflicts caused by limited resources were common in early human society, but the Price equation is abstracted away from direct group conflicts -considering selective extinction (where groups become extinct due to conflicts or natural disasters) makes it difficult to derive closed-form solutions. To overcome these limitations, we use agent-based modeling to provide insight into systems with interactions between a broad set of conditional strategies. In order to add realism to our model, instead of using Equation (2) to model group-level selection, we introduce direct group conflict; we also incorporate migration between groups into the evolutionary model.
Representation of conditional strategies.
Before delving into the details of agent-based simulation, we will first discuss how conditional strategies are represented. 26 (222) is an unconditional cooperator who never contributes anything. A Type 2 (002) contributes nothing when the average contribution by other group members is less than 0.5, but gradually increases its contribution when the average contribution increases from 0.5; when the average contribution reaches 1, it also contributes 1.
In order to make conditional strategies possible, interactions between group members need to be repeated. We assume the contribution level by each individual is the equilibrium contribution level given all players' strategies: everyone's belief is the same as the actual average contribution by other group members, and everyone contributes according to her strategy and her belief. The equilibrium contribution level is simply the average contribution level when interactions are repeated infinitely. During the interactions, individuals constantly adjust their beliefs according to the actual contributions and adjust their contributions level based the updated beliefs. When none of the group members change their beliefs and contributions, contributions reach equilibrium.
Under certain circumstances, initial beliefs may influence the equilibrium contribution. When every group member uses Type 5 (perfectly conditional cooperation), for example, the equilibrium contribution will be the same as the initial belief. In the simulation, we assume individuals start with optimistic beliefs -they believe everyone will exert full contribution initially -and adjust their beliefs and contribution in the process of interacting with others.
Agent-based simulations. Figure 9 demonstrates the evolutionary process of the agent-based simulation.
The total population size and group size are kept constant throughout the simulation. Initially, each individual uses a random strategy. Individuals then reproduce and pass on their strategies based on the payoff each strategy brings. Only individuals reproduce, but the selection exists both on intra-group level and inter-group level. Strategies that perform well within a group are likely to spread within the group, while strategies that make groups successful are more likely to prevail among groups. During the group competition step, groups with higher contribution levels are more likely to win if a conflict happens. When the difference between the average contributions between two competing group is greater than 0.1, the group with higher contribution will win for sure. Note that here the difference in the average group payoffs is the same as the difference in the average group contributions, so equivalently, we can express the probability of winning as a function of the average group payoff. Because of this, we observe a tension between intra-group selection and inter-group selection. While strategies prescribing higher contribution are less advantageous within a group, groups with higher contribution are more likely to win in case of a conflict.
Assuming strong intra-group selection, the baseline payoff w 0 specified in Equation (1) is set as 0. Mutation rate is set to be 0.01. In the baseline simulation, the population has 20 groups, each with n = 20 members. We also investigate the effect of probability of group conflict k, group size n, migration rate m, as well as the baseline fitness w 0 . Population size is kept constant around 400 as the group size n varies. The parameters explored in the simulation are shown in Table 1 . How well these parameters reflect early human environments is discussed in 57 . For each set of parameters we have 50 runs of simulation, and each run lasts for T = 5000 generations. Because there is a large amount of randomness caused by group conflicts, reproduction, mutation, migration, etc., the results presented in the next section are based on the average over the 50 runs.
